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Abstract 	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the influence of the EU exerted in the dialogue between 
Kosovo and Serbia with focus on foreign policy instruments. Normalizations 
of relations between Kosovo and Serbia were considered to be hard case for 
any diplomacy knowing their past enmities, disputes and a tradition of not 
talking to each-other, yet EU was able to successfully conclude three-
landmark agreement that have narrowed the gap of disputes between the 
parties, increased stability in the Balkans and open their pathway to EU 
integration. How was EU able to bring parties to the table of dialogue and 
how did it exert influence and with what foreign policy instruments is the 
main motivation of the thesis. A qualitative case study approach is employed. 
A thorough process tracing has been carried out which consisted in analyzing 
official documents from EU and the agreements reached in the dialogue. 
Apart from process tracing, six interviews have been carried out with all three 
parties in the dialogue to ensure the validity of the findings.  The findings 
suggest that EU has successfully used ascension criteria and enlargement 
conditionality as main foreign policy instruments to influence the outcome of 
negotiations, while the Europeanization process has been an important 
intervening variable in reorienting the countries policies towards EU. The 
findings also confirm that EU is an undisputable and enormous influential 
actor in third countries as long as it keeps open the promise of membership. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
“So why isn’t the dialogue easier? Well the answer is they don’t always see it 
like that (long-term gains). Sometimes they are more focused on some 
apparent loss and often, the short-term loss is clearer than the long-term gain” 
Robert Cooper, 2012 
 
This thesis examines the instruments of EU’s foreign policy and their 
effectiveness in normalizing the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The 
thesis represent both; an exploratory and explanatory study since it first 
explores which instruments of the EU foreign policy were used to exert 
influence in the negotiations between the disputing parties and second it 
explains and analyses how they were utilized. 
 
In the Kosovo War in 1999, EU had only a limited role due to the lack of 
internal cohesion on the Kosovo issue, especially concerning the right to 
intervention by NATO (Shepherd, 2009, p.5) (Hill & Smith, 2011, p.206) 
(Rodt & Wolff, 2012, p.2) (Howorth, 2006, p.15). Nevertheless in 1999 a 
number of EU members, under United States leadership joined NATO 
bombing campaign of Yugoslavia. For the first time ever since it creation EU 
established its presence in the Balkans1. EU’s presence in Kosovo was 
established under United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) were it had a 
special pillar called UNMIK European Union Pillar2. In Serbia EU became 
present since 1980s, although with a symbolic role. Until 2008, EU’s 
presence remained week and with a limited impact until Kosovo declared 
independence in 2008, which marked the beginning of a new era for the 
Balkans.  
 
After 120 days of intense negotiations with no results, in 2008 Kosovo 
declared its independence from Serbia in a coordinated move with major 
international actors including United States and many of EU member states. 
The Declaration of Independence was not recognized by Serbia, which 
committed itself in blocking international recognitions for Kosovo and 
declared that it will never recognize its independence. By the end of 2008, 
twenty-two out of twenty-seven EU countries recognize Kosovo3, sending the 
signal to Serbia that the independence is an irreversible process.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1There was a Delegation of the European Commission in Belgrade since 1982, but under 
Milosevic regime, its representation was rather symbolic.  
2 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/background.shtml  
3 Cyprus, Romania, Spain, Slovakia and Greece do not recognize Kosovo and are often 
referred to as ‘non-recognizers’ 
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In its battle to block Kosovo’s recognition, in 2010 Serbia asks for an 
Opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) asking whether the 
“unilateral declaration of independence from Kosovo is in compliance with 
international law and UN resolution on Kosovo 12444? ICJ opinion, contrary 
to Serbia’s expectations judged that Kosovo’s declaration of Independence5 
was neither in violation of international law nor resolution 1244”. This was an 
unfavorable opinion for Serbia which than asked for a new UN resolution for 
Kosovo6. Such move was successfully stopped by EU, which than took the 
initiative to make a joint resolution, which among others called for direct 
dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia to solve the remaining disputes.  
 
Under EU’s initiative both Kosovo and Serbia, agreed to have direct talks 
under EU facilitation. Nevertheless the dialogue is than conducted in very 
ambiguous and fogy atmosphere. First, Kosovo accepts to enter into direct 
dialogue with the condition that the issue of Status (its sovereignty) will not 
be part of the dialogue and that dialogue in any point should not lead to 
reopening status talks, and also with the promise that EU will oversee and 
serve as a guarantee for the process and its results. Serbia accepts to enter into 
the dialogue with the condition that the dialogue will be treated ‘status 
neutral’ by EU, meaning that Kosovo will not be treated as an independent 
state. EU, which had among itself recognizers and nonrecognizers of 
Kosovo’s independence, agreed to accept both conditions, thus it treated the 
dialogue as status neutral. 
 
The aim of the direct dialogue was to solve the technical matters and disputes 
that were become and obstacle for the further integration into EU for both 
parties, and for facilitating the life of ordinary citizens in the north that were 
hardened and isolated since declaration of independence.  
 
Kosovo and Serbia had a long history of not talking to each other and not 
agreeing to anything. EU had learned such experience in the Rambouillet 
talks (1999)7 where after many weeks of negotiations, Serbia refused to 
accept the final agreement, which resulted in NATO bombing, and from 
Vienna Talks (2005-2007) where after two years of negotiations they couldn’t 
agree and Kosovo declared unilateral independence as a result. In both these 
processes8, EU wasn’t the most important actor and none of the parties neither 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Under Resolution 1244, Kosovo was put under UN administration which established the 
self- governing institutions http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement  
5 http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635 
6 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=28&nav_id=68748 
7 Kosovo had agreed to a an agreement proposed from International community, but Serbia 
had refused. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/285097.stm  
8 Rambouillet (1999) and Vienna Talks (2005-2007) 
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Serbia nor Kosovo were relying in EU. Kosovo never agreed to sit on a table 
with Serbia without United States presence and Serbia without the presence 
of Russia, while EU was the third choice.  
 
At a time when EU had expressed the ambition to facilitate the dialogue 
between Kosovo and Serbia without the presence of United States and Russia, 
looked not very promising. Yet EU surprised many skeptics by revealing the 
capability of its foreign policy and its newly established European External 
Action Service (EEAS). Since the negotiations have started in March 2011 
until April 19, 2013 Kosovo and Serbia have signed 8 agreements, among 
them three very important agreements that touched the borders, international 
representation and issues of authority over disputed territory on the northern 
Kosovo. All these issues were close to the sovereignty of Kosovo. 
 
The success of EU as a mediator, was attributed both to the creation of EEAS 
and to the changes that were made in the field of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) with the Lisbon Treaty, and as an answer to the long 
hindering issue of expectation capability gap. For the first time EU was able 
to rise expectations for providing a solution and capable of delivering one.   
Such success inevitably triggers the curiosity of the researchers, which is 
what instruments did EU use to succeed and how? 
 
In my attempt in finding the answers to such questions I focus on the three 
landmark agreements where negotiations were more intense and the 
compromises where considered to be higher. I carry out a process tracing 
where I analyze all relevant information and than I carry out interviews with 
key persons involved in the process of negotiations.  
 
This thesis is organized as follows; in the first section I present the 
introduction where I address the problem and the phenomenon under 
investigation and propose a research question, than I give an overview of the 
existing research in the area and make a literature overview. I present the 
theoretical framework where I present the main school of thoughts and justify 
on my choice for the use of theory. I move on in talking about foreign policy 
in general and EU foreign policy and its instruments in particular and present 
a categorization of foreign policy instruments. In the second section I present 
the research design and strategy where I justify on the case selection 
methodology and the data collection than I present the methodology for 
processing and analyzing the data. In the third section I present the findings 
in a coordinated way, which is a combination of the findings from the process 
tracing and interviews. In the final section I analyze the findings where I 
focus in analyzing the instruments that where in use by EU (exploratory) and 
how they were utilized (explanatory). In this section I also utilize of the logic 
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of action (appropriateness and consequentiality) by March an Olsen to see 
with what kind of logic EU was operating to wield influence on the both 
parties, than I make a conclusion. 
1.1 The Research Question and Goal 
 
One of the prominent and leading scholar on the EU foreign policy, Karen 
Smith, during an Anna Lindh award lecture suggests that; ‘Proving’ the EU 
has influence (or not, and what sort and why) requires considerable 
empirical research (and particularly a lot of interviewing, and reading 
materials not necessarily in an EU language) – outside the EU, and 
necessarily involving non-EU based scholars (…). This sort of research could 
go from investigating the effectiveness of EU aid policies (in particular 
countries, sectors, regions), to analysing the EU’s influence in international 
diplomatic processes, to gauging the extent to which major powers consider 
the EU to be an actor, or even a power, worth listening to (and so on). This 
means separating out EU influence from that of other domestic and 
international actors – an inherently difficult task – but unless we try to get to 
the bottom of this, we are left with unsubstantiated assertions about the EU’s 
place/role/influence in the world” (Smith, 2007) 
 
The outcome of the negotiations is already known, but like Smith (2007) 
suggests, we should shed light on the manners and strategies it has used, 
therefore central to this this thesis is finding out how EU managed to succeed 
and with what tools. EU is a unique international actor and as Michael Smith 
(1997) has put it “The EU has the economic capacity to reward and punish; it 
has the technical and administrative capacity to support and stabilize; and it 
has the capacity to negotiate in ways unknown to many of the other 
participants in the European order”.  
 
This thesis aims both; proving that EU has considerable influence in 
particular situations and processes, such as the enlargement process, and the 
ability and capacity to live up to its expectations, thus becoming a deliverable 
actor (at least in its own region).  
 
Hence, the research question of the thesis is; 
How did EU exerted influence in Kosovo-Serbia negotiations? 
 
Sub question; 
What instruments of foreign policy did EU use to influence the outcome of 
negotiations? 
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1.2 Existing research on the subject 
 
 
Although the literature on the EU foreign policy is plenty, there is very few 
and scarce research with regards to the EU’s role and influence in the Balkan 
region. Johannes Mikael Maki (2008) has done a research on the “EU 
enlargement politics” with a focus on the political conditionality of full 
cooperation of Balkan countries with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The study is a theory testing study, with 
rationalist and constructivist theories serving as an explanation for the 
development of conditionality. Overall the study concludes that Serbia is 
more far away compared to Croatia in terms of EU norms and values, which 
makes conditionality more resentful.  
 
Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig (2008) have also contributed 
with a research on the “Relations with the Wider Europe”. In their study they 
assess the effectiveness of the EU conditionality. They conclude that: 
“developments in EU relations with the (potential) candidate countries for 
membership in 2007 provide ample evidence for the increased problems of 
enlargement and the decreased effectiveness of accession conditionality, such 
conclusion they said is evident especially in case of Serbia where majority of 
the Member States was willing to accept an unconditional fast-track and 
thereby risked compromising the EU’s threat of excluding noncompliant 
candidates. (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2008, p.154) 
 
Other contributions with regard to the EU enlargement policies and the 
Balkans include Marko Klasnja (2007) with a view on the EU conditionality 
on Kosovo. Denisa Kostovicova (2013) on the EU Enlargement 
conditionality. Wolfgang Koeth (2013), on “The Serbia-Kosovo Agreement 
on Kosovo’s Regional Representation and the ‘Feasibility Study’; A 
Breakthrough in EU – Kosovo Relations? Dejan Guzina and Branka Marijan 
(2014) bring the interesting concept of “constructive ambiguity” to explain 
the EU’s approach toward Kosovo’s status as a central part of negotiations 
between Kosovo and Serbia in Brussels. Stefan Lehne, (2012) on the 
normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Lehne’s article, like in 
Koeth case, is an article on the actual negotiations between Kosovo and 
Serbia in Brussels until 2012.  
The closest research on the field consist the Master Thesis of Valmir Jusufi 
(2013) for Lund University program in European Affairs “Squaring the 
Circle, Assesing the EU foreign Policy Impact in Kosovo”. Valmir’s thesis is 
a comprehensive ‘outside-in’ approach not focused on particular agreements, 
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but rather on overall processes only in Kosovo where he assesses EU impact 
on a range of events that stretch for close to a decade.  
All the above research has in a way addressed the EU’s impact on the 
Balkans but some have not had the focus on the recent negotiations between 
Serbia and Kosovo and others shy away from being specific and measuring 
EU’s influence in particular situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  12	  
2.0 Theoretical Overview 
 2.1 EU foreign Policy, Definitions, concepts and theories 
 
Foreign Policy has traditionally been seen as the domain of sovereign nation 
states and as such; a realist perspective, which claims that states are the 
dominant actors, who do not recognize any authority above them and defend 
and promote their national interests (Hill & Michael, 2011, p.27). Yet, EU is 
not a state in a conventional wisdom, nor is it an international organization 
like UN which has led many authors among them Simon Hix to call it a sui 
generis (Hix 2011). (see also Wallace, Pollack and Young 2010) (and K. E. 
Smith 2003, 14-15) 
 
This specific nature of EU calls also for specific attention with regard to the 
study of EU foreign policy, therefore some definitions on the EU foreign 
policy are necessary.  
 
For Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, EU foreign policy is understood as multi-
pillar, multilevel, operating within a complex multi-locational web of 
interlocking actors and processes (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p.34), 
whereas for Hill (in Peterson and Sjursen 1998, 19) EU foreign policy is “the 
sum of what the EU and its member states do in international relations. With 
the goal of promoting European values and interests, Hazel Smith (2002) 
defines foreign policy as “the capacity to make and implement policies 
abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the 
European Union. White (2001) recognizes foreign policy as shaped by actors, 
processes, issues, instruments, context and outputs, which are interrelated and 
constitute a foreign policy system in action.  
 
All these definitions, and many others, point to the distinct nature of the EU 
foreign policy. This distinct nature (often referred as nature of the beast 
(Risse-Kappen, 1996)), points out that EU does have a foreign policy but it is 
complicated compared to nation-states foreign policy, due to the internal 
processes and due to the member states different interests. 
 
This thesis recognizes the specific nature of EU foreign policy as comprised 
by multi-levels of decision-making by the different role of EU institutions and 
specific interests of Member States, yet it is not concerned with specific role 
each institution or member state has played in the negotiations between 
Kosovo and Serbia but it is concerned with the EU’s foreign policy and its 
influence as whole.  
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EU foreign policy, like the conventional foreign policy, has not escaped from 
the traditional theoretical thinking and the school of thoughts. This thesis 
pays attention to three school of thoughts; realism, liberalism and 
constructivism. As I explain the importance of all three schools I illuminate in 
the constructivism as the most applicable choice for this study.  
 
The realist school can be understood as a body of theories and related 
arguments that flow from a very small set of basic assumptions about how the 
world works. (Smith et al., 2012, p.35) 
 
It has often portrayed as a school of thought based on three core assumptions 
about how the world works. First is groupism – which states that humans face 
one another as members of groups with nation-states being most important 
group. Second, is egoism – asserting that self-interest ultimately drives 
political behavior and although certain conditions can facilitate altruistic 
behavior, egoism is rotted in human nature and that inhumanity is humanity 
under pressure and third power-centrism is fundamental feature of politics. 
(Smith et al., 2012, p.36) 
 
For realists explaining EU’s foreign policy is not a simple endeavor, they 
admit that EU has undoubtedly emerged as an important element of Europe’s 
security architecture, and neorealists need to account for such 
institutionalized multilateral co-operation. (Grieco in Hyde-Price, 2006), 
neverthless such cooperation they argue is due to shared interstes of Member 
States, so they argue that EU can only go as far as long as this does not 
conflict with their core national interests. 
Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) considers that member states who comprise EU are 
interested in the stability of their external environment, consequently they 
pursue through EU what Arnold Wolfers (in Hyde-Price, 2006) termed as 
‘milieu goals, meaning that EU external policy co-operation constitutes a 
collective attempt at milieu shaping, driven primarily by the Union’s largest 
powers”. The idea that member states interests drive EU foreign policy is also 
rooted in the liberal intergovernmentalism of Moravsick. Moravcsik believes 
that EU is build upon interests and objectives of MS, thus every institution 
has as much competences as it responds to MS and not more. (Rosamond, 
1999) 
 
The realist school falls short in explaining the increased role and presence of 
EU in the Balkans, which as the thesis aims to show, it has gradually become 
the most important man in town. The case of Kosovo and Serbia negotiations 
are a testimony that despite different interests of MS in Kosovo, they were 
able to follow a unified policy, which does not respond to realist thinking and 
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acting and therefore makes the core assumptions of the theory not relevant for 
this study. 
 
Liberalism is a response to realist critique, which states that; states are not the 
only actors in the world politics thus recognizing the role of supranational 
organizations such as EU, Interstate anarchy can be tamed by a network of 
relations between states, thus emphasizing cooperation instead of anarchy, 
and power does not necessarily mean military power, but it can also have an 
economic nature, which gives more room for manure and more role for 
supranational organizations like EU. (Hill & Michael, 2011)  Liberalism is 
more concerned with internal developments in EU policies and it falls short in 
explaining the developments in CFSP. As mentioned above, Andrew 
Moravcsik is a pioneer of liberal intergovernmentalism, which argues that 
‘delegating certain policies to a supranational level, (in this case CFSP) 
governments can increase, rather than decrease their power, because they gain 
extra resources against their domestic adversaries’. (Hill & Michael, 2011, 
p.33).  
 
Out of the three schools of thoughts, social constructivism seems to provide 
the concepts and elements that can shed light on the changes cased by EU in 
external orders. Flockhart (in Smith et al., 2012) considers that social 
constructivism is a toolbox for understanding how agents’ shared knowledge; 
identities and interests are interlinked and may contribute to changing deeply 
embedded practices and structural conditions. (Smith et al., 2012, p.81) 
 
She recognizes Europeanization through historical sociology and social 
constructivism. For her Europeanization can be characterized as different 
forms of diffusion processes of European ideas and practices across time and 
space and social constructivism provides a framework for understanding 
structure/agency relations in continuously ongoing identity construction 
processes. (Flockhart, 2010, p.788)  
 
She conceptualizes constructivism into four concepts: first; A belief in the 
social construction of reality and the importance of social facts, second; A 
focus on ideational as well as material structures and the importance of norms 
and rules, third; A focus on the role of identity in shaping political action and 
the importance of logic of action, and fourth; A belief in the mutual 
constitutiveness of agents and structure and a focus on practice and action 
(Smith et al., 2012, p.88). 
 
While the term remains pretty much elusive and depending on the view it can 
take several forms, for this thesis elements of Europeanization such as 
identity and rules as a social constructivist approach are important as an 
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interaction involving identity constructions at both the elite and mass levels. 
(Flockhart, 2010, p.796) 
 
Europeanization was introduced by Tanja A. Börzel (1999) as a top-down 
approach to explain how domestic policy-making had become increasingly 
subject to European policy-making in Spain and Germany, but it was than 
later developed to other EU policy areas. She later explored further the 
approach to mean first as ‘the emergence and the development at the 
European level of distinct structures of governance’ and second as; ‘[an] 
incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’ (Börzel & Risse, 
2000, p.4). 
 
Despite being elusive, it has been adopted by different scholars. Heather 
Grabbe (2006), applies Europeanization as an approach in explaining the 
EU’s influence and transformative power in Central and Eastern Europe. She 
considers that Europeanization includes calculations of material interest, and 
changes in the logic of behaviour of domestic actors and institutions that are 
driven by the absorption of EU norms (Grabbe, 2006, p.2).9 
 
Europeanization has been recognized both as a theory and as an approach. 
Ruben Wong (in Hill & Smith, 2011, p.159) compares it to globalization 
theory and referst to it as a theory, while Bulmer (2007) considers it as a 
phenomenon that a range of theoretical approaches have seek to explain. 
For Bulmer (2007), in order to understand the relationship between the theory 
and Europeanization two steps are necessary; first, what processes are 
understood as Europeanization? And second what are the causal relationships, 
which the theory seeks to explain? 
Olsen (in Bulmer, 2007 and Hill & Smith, 2011, p.150) identifies five 
processes of Europeanization, among which is the ability of Europeanization 
process in making changes in external borders, referring to the extension of 
policies, rules and institutional requirements and values in the new MS, such 
as 2004 enlargement. 
 
In this thesis I employ Europeanization as a powerful social constructivist 
approach, which has the ability to explain the evolutional change in 
reorientation of Balkans towards EU since EU established its presence in the 
region.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Grabbe’s study is valuable contribution for this thesis not just on the use of Europeanization 
as an approach but also on carving the instruments of EU conditionality 
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2.2 EU Foreign Policy Instruments 
 
With the Lisbon Treaty, EU has enhanced foreign policy instruments. Such 
enhancement includes the creation of European External Action Service 
(EEAS), the establishment of the post of the President of the EU and 
strengthening of the post of High Representative (HR) for CFSP. The Treaty 
on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) clearly lays out what is 
external action for European Union.  
 
Part five of the TFEU, Article 206-222 TFEU lists the following as external 
actions; 
• Common commercial policy  
• Development aid  
• Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries  
• Humanitarian aid  
• Restrictive measures  
• International agreements  
• The Union’s relations with international organizations and third countries and 
union delegations, and 
• Solidarity clause 
In Balkans, EU has been present with humanitarian and development aid 
since 1999, especially in Kosovo through UNMIK European Union Pillar. 
The most influential instrument has been trade, which takes part under 
Common commercial policy. In Balkans, trade is framed under Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (SAA) agreement, which according to Keukeleire 
& MacNaughtan (2008) has been essential in driving change in Balkans. “A 
decision to conclude a trade agreement with a third country/regional 
organization, as well as the depth and scope of this agreement, is to a large 
extent foreign policy” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p.202).  
 
Others include International agreements, based on which all Balkan countries 
were offered contractual relations with EU. Such contractual relations were 
made under SAA, which gives Balkan countries access to internal market and 
development aid, and as such are considered as highly political and as main 
instruments of foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008).) 
Creation of EEAS and the strengthening role of HR of CFSP gave a more 
common and unique voice to EU foreign policy, which was felt in Balkans 
more than anywhere else.  
 
A list of EU foreign policy instruments is given by Karen Smith (2003) where 
she distinguishes diplomatic and economic instruments. A division of EU 
foreign policy instruments in economic and diplomatic has been provided by 
	  17	  
Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008) also.  
 
Figure 1.0 
Source: (Smith, 2003) 
  
For Schunz (2010) “it is reasonable to assume that, in the realm of 
international relations, influence attempts of states or the EU take the form of 
foreign policy acts such as economic and diplomatic instruments” (Schunz, 
2010, p.27) 
Therefore a division between diplomatic and economic foreign policy 
instruments is fairly evident.  
 
With regard to the Kosovo and Serbia dialogue, the use of foreign policy 
instruments is not clear-cut. As the main assumption of this thesis, 
enlargement conditionality is assumed to have served EU as an umbrella for 
exerting influence. This means that trade agreement as an economic 
instrument is conditioned and combined with political dialogue as a 
diplomatic instrument (Smith, 2003). Therefore enlargement as a EU foreign 
policy cannot be simply defined as economic or diplomatic instrument but 
rather a foreign policy instruments that allows for use of different instruments 
to wield and exert influence. 
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2.3 EU foreign policy towards Western Balkans  
Having defined what is commonly understood with EU foreign policy and 
presenting the main theories, it is now important to focus on the EU foreign 
policy with regard to Western Balkans.  
As a major international player, EU has unique foreign policy with regard to 
specific regions where it has established its presence.10 Western Balkans has 
had a special place in EU’s foreign policy since the Feira conclusion, soon 
after the Kosovo war in 1999, where it was decided that all Western Balkan 
countries should be given the potential candidate status an that each of them 
will be assessed separately based on individual merits, according to 
Gothenburg criteria.11 
 
EU’s foreign policy in the Balkans has been framed through the framework of 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). SAP is the European Union's 
policy towards the Western Balkans, established with the aim of eventual EU 
membership.12 
 
SAP was launched in June 1999 and strengthened at the Thessaloniki Summit 
in June 2003 taking over elements of the accession process.  
It rests on: 
• Contractual relationships (bilateral Stabilization and Association agreements 
– SAA)  
• Trade relations (Autonomous trade measures)  
• Financial assistance (Instrument for Pre-accession)  
• Regional cooperation and good neighborly relations13 
This is the framework for all Balkan Countries, including Serbia and Kosovo. 
The SAP process is comprehensive and it starts by signing a contractual 
agreement with EU known as SAA and ends up with EU membership. 
 
EU’s policy in the balkans has been framed by Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 
(2008) as structural foreign policy (SFP). SFP consist not just on bringing 
peace, such was NATO intervention, but it consist on creating new structures 
which makes the peace sustainable (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p.27) 
The benefit of using such approach is that it allows for the use of instruments 
that traditionally fall outside the realm of foreign policy but which are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 http://eeas.europa.eu/regional_policies/index_en.htm  
11 The speed of each country towards membership in the EU is based on individual merits and 
achievements of these countries, a standard that was decided in Presidency Conclusions in 
Gothenburg, June 2001, known as the principle of differentiation. http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/background/docs/goteborg_concl_en.pdf 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm  
13 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm  
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considered essential in explaining EU’s successful foreign policy especially 
in East Europe and Balkans (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p.199) 
 
The core assumptions of SFP are that it seeks to influence or shape 
sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and other structures in a 
given geographic area (Keukeleire et al., 2011). For Keukeleire, SAP is the 
cornerstone of EU’s approach and structural foreign policy in the region, 
while SAA is the main instrument that offers contractual relations with EU. 14 
 
This thesis accepts the explanatory power of the SFP approach in explaining 
the increased stability in the region and the progress on economy and 
development of the democracy. Furthermore it acknowledges the importance 
of creating new structures such is the whole body of institutions engaged in 
the fulfilling of accession criteria for EU membership. 
  2.4 Enlargement Conditionality 
 
2.4.1Accession criteria 
 
Perhaps the strongest and the most influential foreign policy instrument with 
regard to future member is the enlargement conditionality.  
The enlargement process provides mechanisms and incentives, culminating in 
membership. For Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008), enlargement was and is 
EU’s most successful structural foreign policy and EU’s most important 
foreign policy instrument. Conditionality refers to the practice of making the 
conclusion and implementation of agreements, cooperation and assistance 
dependent on certain conditions being met (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 
2008, p.207) 
 
For Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008) Conditionality can take several 
forms; positive and negative, political and economic, ex ante and ex post. 
Among all forms ‘ex ante’ represents the most sophisticated form of 
conditionality because it means that there will be no agreement with EU 
unless the spelled out conditions are met in detail. Under such conditions, 
rewarding “good” behavior and punishing lack of compliance has 
underpinned the EU’s foreign policy in the Balkans (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008, p.267) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 SAA governs political, trade and economic relations of the EU with the Balkan countries. It 
covers areas such as the four freedoms, including the creation of a free trade area; the 
approximation of legislation to the EU acquis; political dialogue and cooperation in all areas 
of EU policies, including in the area of freedom, security and justice. (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008, p.266).  
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The use of incentives such as enlargement conditionality and financial 
assistance, framed as capacity-building has been viewed by Börzel & Risse 
(2011) as reasons of inducing institutional change and for achieving its own 
instrumental interests, such as security, stability, prosperity, and 
environmental protection (Börzel & Risse, 2011, p.9).  
 
Perhaps, the greatest contribution so far on the importance of enlargement 
conditionality has been provided by the study of Heather Grabbe (2006). 
Grabbe (2006) has utilized europeanization as an approach in explaining the 
EU’s influence in the cultural change and shift in the post communist central 
and eastern Europe and has provided empirical findings on the EU’s success 
in transforming domestic policies of central and eastern europe. 
 
This thesis pays special attention to eh elargement conditionality with the 
assumption that it has also been a key instrument for EU to exerte influence 
in the parties during negotiation process. 
   2.5 The notion of Influence 
 
 
The central theme of the thesis is the assessment of EU influence, therefore it 
is important first to understand influence and what parameters to use for 
measuring it. In his article on “how to asses EU’s influence in international 
affairs” Simon Schunz (2010), brings some basic definitions on the method of 
understanding and measuring influence, such as; a) influence as an 
interaction between an influence wielder and an influence target, during 
which both change into the same direction b) as “control over outcomes” c) 
as “mind changer” of the influenced and d) as the one actor intentionally 
communicating to another so as to alter the latter’s behaviour from what 
would have occurred otherwise. 
 
These four concepts imply that there must be a causal relationship between 
existence of influence and the outcomes, thus there must be evidence that the 
activities of EU are related with the results and outcomes in the dialogue 
between Kosovo and Serbia in Brussels. All four concepts are of interest but 
only (b) and (c) seem to be relevant for this thesis. As there obviously has 
been interaction between EU and Kosovo and Serbia, never the less I expect 
little or no possibility for Kosovo and Serbia to have influenced EU so that 
they would both change in the same direction, therefore for logical reasons, 
the first (a) is excluded from being applicable. Whereas the last (d) is not 
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applicable not due to the logical reasoning but because it is considered a hard 
case of finding evidence that EU has used intentional communication with 
one of the parties in order to convince them to do what they otherwise not do. 
Such research would have required access to confidential information, such as 
e-mails, phone calls and informal meetings, which the author did not have. 
 
Thus the thesis will focus on the second concept “as control over outcomes”. 
EU has been officially a facilitator, but its actual role was argued to be “not 
facilitation but rather heavy-duty mediation, including setting the agenda, 
elaborating solutions, and using massive carrots and sticks to bring the parties 
on board” (Lehne, 2012, p.8). The empirical findings will prove the breadth 
and the extent of such control and by what means. With regard to the third, 
EU has been present for more than a decade present in both Kosovo and 
Serbia, thus the notion of EU as “mind changer” can certainly be argued 
under the Europeanization process, which in this thesis is an intervening 
variable but with a huge potential in explaining the parties readiness to start 
the dialogue and to successfully come up with agreements.  
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3.0 Research Design and Strategy 
 
 
For the research design and methodology, this thesis has chosen Yin’s (2009) 
and George and Bennett (2005) contribution. The justification for this lays on 
the tools and the fitness of their contribution with the thesis research goal.  
 
This thesis is a qualitative case study, which aims at assessing EU’s influence 
in the case of Kosovo and Serbia negotiations. According to Yin (2009), Case 
study is one of several ways of doing social science research. Others include 
experiments, surveys, histories, and economic and epidemiologic research.  
 
As already mentioned above, this thesis is interested in proving that EU is an 
influential actor. To prove that, the case of Kosovo and Serbia negotiations 
have been chosen as a case where under EU’s mediation, three landmark 
agreements were reached between two parties with major disputes.   
 
According to Yin there is no formula to know whether one should do a case 
study or other type of research, but the choice depends on the research 
questions and whether the questions require an in-depth or extensive analysis. 
Case studies are considered to be the preferred method when; a) “how” or 
“why” questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little or no control 
over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with a real-
life context. (Yin, 2009, p.Kindle Locations 429) 
 
Accordingly, this thesis meets almost all the above-mentioned requirements. 
First, it employs a “how” and “what” questions: How did EU exert influence 
in Kosovo-Serbia talks, and; what instruments of foreign policy did EU use to 
influence the outcome of negotiations? Second, it focuses on a negotiation 
process that resulted with three landmark agreements between Kosovo and 
Serbia under EU’s mediation in Brussels. As an investigator the author of the 
thesis has not been participant or observer in the process thus has not had any 
control over the events. And third, the negotiation process has started in 2011 
with technical issues and is still going on in political level, but the focus is on 
the three agreements that were signed in 2012 and 2013 amounting to a 
contemporary phenomenon. 
 
A case study has been defined as an empirical inquiry that (1) investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life contexts, 
especially (2) when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident (Yin, 2009, p.Kindle Locations 639) 
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Yin suggest that there are three types or methods of case studies; exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory. The choice of type or method consist on 
conditions such are: (1) type of research question, (2) extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioral events and (3) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin, 2009, p.Kindle Locations 
427) 
 
Figure 2.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Yin, 2009) 
 
The thesis is an explanatory case study since it aims at explaining how EU 
exerted its influence and it is also exploratory since it aims at finding what 
foreign policy instruments EU used to exert such influence.    
 
Besides their relevance, case studies have been criticized for not being rigor, 
meaning that they are not thorough or very accurate, a problem, which 
according to Yin (2009) can be overcome if the researcher reports all 
evidence fairly adds multiple sources of input and creates a chain of evidence.  
 
Critics also have claimed that case studies provide little basis for scientific 
generalization, and that they take too long, and result in massive, unreadable 
documents. Having a clear research question and design that avoids 
unnecessary materials can eliminate such problems. 
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3.1 Research Design 
 
 
The research design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to 
a study’s initial research questions and, ultimately to its conclusions, or to put 
simply, a plan from getting from initial research question to the conclusions.  
Nachmias & Nachmias (in Yin 2009, Kindle Locations 798) define it as a 
plan that guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analyzing, and 
interpreting observations.  
 
For Yin (2009), the main purpose of the design is to help to avoid the 
situation in which the evidence does not address the initial research question.  
To avoid such situation Yin (2009) suggests five research design components 
to be taken into account when doing case study:  
1. A study’s questions 
2. Its propositions 
3. Its unit(s) of analysis; 
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions; and  
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings. 
 
Study’s Question – The research question has already been addressed above.  
 
Propositions – According to Yin, having a good research question does not 
necessarily point out what one should study, thus some propositions are 
necessary to keep the project moving in the right direction (Yin, 2009, 
p.Kindle Locations 892). This thesis project puts forward two propositions.  
 
First, it assumes that EU has heavily relied on enlargement conditionality to 
exert influence on the parties. 
Second, it assumes that Europeanization process has had a profound influence 
in reorienting the two countries policies towards EU. 
 
Unit of Analysis – For Karen Long (2004) a unit of analysis is the most basic 
element of a scientific research project. That is, it is the subject (the who or 
what) of study about which an analyst may generalize. In this thesis the unit 
of analysis is EU.  It is the specific research question that seeks to explain 
how EU exerted influence that determines the accurate unit of analysis. EU 
has been a facilitator of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and has 
overseen the outcomes15. It is the objective of this thesis to understand how 
EU has used its instruments to exert influence on the parties during the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Both parties (Kosovo and Serbia) have required from EU to serve as a gurantee for the 
implementation of the agreements that were reached. IWET 
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negotiation process; therefore EU is the main unit under analysis or the case 
under study. Although EU is the main unit of analysis, this thesis looks only 
in the field of EU foreign policy to narrow the scope of analysis.  
 
The logic linking the data to the propositions - With regard to the method of 
linking data to propositions this thesis aims to do an explanation building.  
 
Figure 3.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Yin (2009) 
 
As illustrated by figure three this thesis employs a holistic - single case study 
design. Yin makes the primary distinction between multiple case and single 
case designs and holistic and embedded cases studies. I chose to do a holistic 
single case design for some reasons. First, as mentioned above the context of 
this study is the EU foreign policy, with EU being the unit under analysis or 
the case under study. Although the member states (MS) play a significant and 
crucial role in shaping such policy, they are not considered separately in this 
thesis. MS role together with the role of EU institutions are considered to be 
embedded or the subunits. 
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3.2 Quality of Research design 
3.2.1 Data collection 
 
Figure 4.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Yin  (2009 
As shown in figure four, Yin puts forward four test to judge the quality of the 
research design; a) construct validity, b) internal validity, c) External validity, 
and d) reliability (Yin, 2009, p.Kindle Locations 1100). The thesis has aimed 
at satisfying each given test.   
 
Construct validity: Part of the criticism regarding case studies is that they are 
not rigor and thorough enough and it was suggested that multiple sources of 
evidence should be added to overcome such problem. This thesis has used 
multiple sources of evidence:  
 
Figure 5.0 Source: Yin (2009) 
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Empirical primary sources:  
EU official documents - as part of process tracing,16 sixty-three (63)17 official 
EU documents were thoroughly checked and carefully analyzed.  
 
Original agreements reached in the dialogue - all 3 agreements that were 
target of the thesis were thoroughly analyzed.  
 
Newspaper clippings and articles - all relevant articles and news were 
consulted. The author had access to the media from all three sites in the 
dialogue.  
 
Interviews - Yin (2009) considers interviews to be one of the most important 
sources of case study information. The types of interviews carried out were 
in-depth interviews opposed to focused interviews and surveys. In-depth 
interviews allow the interviewee to express her/his own opinions on the 
matter and allow for freer information were the interviewee could serve as an 
informant. (Yin, 2009)  
In this thesis I have made two personal interviews and I have borrowed 4 
interviews from Karen Stokkendal Poulsen. 18  Interviews have given me 
unique access to the process of the dialogue when it was conducted in 
Brussels. Both representatives were aware that the interviews were official 
thus their views represent also the country’s view.19 The same goes also for 
the interviews conducted by Poulsen.20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Which is elaborated under internal validity part below 
17 From the period mid 2010 till mid 2014: 9 Council Conclusions, 4+4 Progress Reports, 4 
Enlargement Strategies, 6 EU Press releases, 20 EU statements, 3 Annual HR reports to 
Parliament, 1 Commission Opinion on Serbia’s Candidate Status, 2 EU joint reports on 
Kosovo and Serbia. 1 Feasibility study on Kosovo, 2 accession conferences with Serbia 
18 Karen Stokkendal Poulsen is a Danish Student. She holds an MA from Goldsmiths College, 
London University, MA Screen Documentary. She has conducted interviews for her 
Documentary called “The Agreement” and for her Master thesis with a research question: 
How has the EU facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue enabled de-securitisation of the 
Serbia-Kosovo conflict and to what extent has the conflict been desecuritised? She has given 
me access to her transcript of interviews and the right to quote them.  
19 With the exception when they have explicitly referred to their opinions as self opinions 
20 Poulsen (2014) makes this reference with regard to her interviews “Since the participants 
are the government representatives for the dialogue, they are responsible for the government 
position and very used to speak on behalf of their governments. Thus, they were noticeably 
very aware of their presentations of the conflict and the dialogue on camera. I therefore for 
my analysis equal the negotiators positions with the official positions. This goes as well for 
Robert Cooper, who is the representative of the EU. He was at the time the highest-ranking 
diplomat at the EEAS and referred directly to HR Ashton, thus, also responsible for the EU 
position. Therefore, I assume that the positions presented by the three representatives can be 
considered valid representations of Serbia, Kosovo and the EU. 
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To avoid bias, all three parties involved in the dialogue were interviewed, 
namely; Brussels, Belgrade and Prishtina.21 The two personal interviews were 
recorded in iPhone through voice-memo and than later transcribed, the other 
four were video recorded and than later transcribed.  
 
Secondary sources: As secondary sources in this thesis are listed books and 
Journals on foreign policy  
 
 3.3 Method  
Internal validity 
 
After collecting the data, Yin suggests choosing an analytical technique or a 
method to analyze them. Among four choices shown in figure four, I chose 
explanation-building model. According to Yin, explaining a phenomenon is 
to stipulate a presumed set of causal links about it, or “how” or “why” 
something happened (Yin, 2009, p.Kindle Locations 2927). Accordingly, I 
am trying to explain how EU exerted influence. The explanation building 
model is combined with process tracing (George & Bennett, 2005, p.206) 
which is a method used to identify the intervening causal process – the causal 
chain and causal mechanisms between the independent variable and the 
outcome of the dependent variable. Process tracing will be able to make a 
causal relationship and explaining the dependent variable and shed light into 
causal mechanisms (Collier, 2011, p.824) 
 
For David Collier (2011) process tracing is a fundamental tool of qualitative 
analysis and it is defined as the systematic examination of diagnostic 
evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses 
posed by the investigator. In this thesis it is used to gain insights into causal 
mechanisms. For Collier (2011) process tracing focuses on the unfolding of 
events or situations over time. (Collier, 2011, p.824)  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 These persons were interviewed: Serbia: Brko Stefanovic; chief negotiator for Serbia 
Delegation on two agreements on IBM and Regional Representation. Dejan Pavicevic who 
serves as liaison officer of Serbia in Kosovo. Mr. Pavicevic has been engaged in the dialogue 
as a participant and as the key person to oversee the implementation of the agreements in 
Kosovo. Marko Jcksic, who is a major of one of the municipalities affected by the Agreement 
on normalization of relations. For Kosovo, Edita Tahiri who was the chief negotiator for 
Kosovo Delegation on two agreements on IBM and Regional Representation and was member 
of the delegation in the third agreement on normalization of relations. From EU; Robert 
Cooper, Head of the EU facilitation team and senior advisor to HR. Fernando Gentilini 
member of EU facilitation team and special representative of EU in Kosovo. 
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This method responds to the nature of my research question since by tracing 
the process of negotiations will be able to identify the causal mechanisms that 
were crucial for the outcome. In this thesis the analytic explanation model of 
process tracing is chosen, since it enables for converting the negotiation 
process into analytical causal explanations (George & Bennett, 2005, p.211) 
 
Table 1.0 
 
Independent variables 
The role of variables is to tell what influences and what causes variation in 
the dependent variable. The variables in the table 1.0 measure variation and 
are connected to the research question (Rafael J & Russell K, 2010, p.52). 
The sub question of the thesis is finding the EU foreign policy instruments 
that were used to wield influence. The following are independent variables of 
interest where EU foreign policy instruments can be found.  
 
Accession criteria (Copenhagen Criteria) – Any country seeking membership 
of the European Union (EU) must conform to the conditions set out by Article 
49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union.23 The criteria are the same yet they are also specific for each country. 
Three important processes that were underway during the negotiations in 
Brussels such as candidate status and accession negotiations with Serbia and 
SAA agreement with Kosovo are part of the enlargement process and part of 
the accession criteria. Although it runs under some set of written rules, 
enlargement conditionality is not predictable since the conditions are specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 With accession criteria these instruments are included: SAA, Candidate Status, Accession 
Negotiations and EU membership. 
23 Any country seeking membership of the European Union (EU) must conform to the 
conditions set out by Article 49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union 
Variables 
Independent  Accession Criteria (EU Copenhagen 
(accession) Criteria, 1993)22 
Visa Liberalization  
Controlled NATO  
Intervening  Europeanization process, US presence 
in Brussels 
Dependent  Normalization of relations between 
Kosovo and Serbia (signing of three 
landmark agreements) 
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for each country.24 In this thesis, this independent variable is considered key 
in causing variation in the dependent variable. 
 
Visa liberalization – visa liberalization is a separate process from accession 
process. But since it offers the perspective of visa free travel to over 20 EU 
members it has been a huge incentive for all Balkan countries, especially for 
Kosovo who is the most isolated country in Europe25. This variable is 
expected to have had a huge impact with regard to the Kosovo delegation. 
 
Controlled Variables 
Lijphart (1971) suggest that controlled variables should be held constant and 
controlled for their influence in the outcome (Lijphart, 1971, p.683). NATO is 
present in Kosovo since 1999, it has been present during Vienna negotiations 
on Kosovo status (2005-2007) were there was no agreement. NATO’s 
presence is of huge importance in securing the peace and stability in the 
region. During the negotiation process in Brussels, Kosovo had put an 
embargo on Serbia’s products due to Serbia’s noncompliance with an 
agreement on Costume Stamps reached during negotiation process. The 
situation escalated rapidly but NATO/KFOR forces took charge of the 
situation and secured peace.26 Nevertheless, NATO presence as a security and 
peace provider in Kosovo will not be considered to have had any influence in 
the outcome of negotiations. 
 
Intervening Variables 
Although the presented independent variables are of key importance and the 
focus for variation in the outcome this thesis recognizes the role of two 
intervening variables in the outcome of negotiations. First is the 
Europeanization process in both Kosovo and Serbia. In line with theoretical 
approach taken in this thesis, Europeanization is expected to have been a very 
important factor in the party’s readiness to come to agreement. Second is 
United States (US) presence. U.S. has been a key player in Kosovo’s politics 
since 1999 and its influence and role in Kosovo politics has been uncontested. 
Their participation as observant during negotiations with the initiation of 
Kosovo delegation implies that they might have had influenced at least the 
Kosovo delegation. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For Serbia, EU has added a special chapter, chapter 35 on normalizing relations with 
Kosovo. This was not a condition for any other country that had to fulfill Copenhagen or 
accession criteria.  
25 http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/kosovo-isolated-heart-europe 
26 During this operation, e Kosovo special police officer was shot dead. 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=07&dd=26&nav_id=75620  
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Dependent variable 
The outcome of the negotiations is already known for this thesis, what remain 
unknown is what EU foreign policy instruments were used and how they 
were used. This thesis considers that the outcome of the negotiations 
(dependent variable) has been dependent on the EU foreign policy 
instruments (independent variables) and their utilization with possible 
influence from the intervening variables. 
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4.0 Context prior to Negotiations  
 
Understanding the significance of the three agreements reached in Brussels 
and the importance they represent for creating a lasting peace in the Balkans, 
an understanding of the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia is necessary 
precondition for understanding the weight and the importance of the 
negotiations outcome. 
 
According to Yugoslavia Constitution of 1974, Kosovo was a constitutive 
part of the Yugoslavia, together with Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia. By the end of 1995 all constitutive parts of 
Yugoslavia had breached through bloody wars,27 and Kosovo was the last 
remaining constitutive part on its way to independence.  
 
Serbia had pledged to never let Kosovo break away and pledged to defend it 
with all means, including, as it was later proven with genocide and ethnic 
cleansing, which was. For Serbia, Kosovo represents their identity and their 
culture. In proving such identity they go back as far as the war of 1389 where 
they lost in the battle against Ottoman Empire in defense of Christianity. 
Furthermore they relate such identity with the huge presence of religious 
objects (orthodox) build for centuries. Albanians have always called Serbs as 
comers and invaders of their land, identity and culture. Albanians in Kosovo 
relate their identity with the land for more than 2000 years ago as the 
descendants of Illyrians and they claim to be the righteous owner of the land. 
(Judah, 2008) 
 
The question of who is the owner of Kosovo (Kosovars or Serbs) has been a 
territorial dispute for centuries and had become a source for bloody wars 
between Albanians and Serbs. In 1999, the dictatorship rule of Milosevic had 
followed an ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which prompted for international 
community to intervene. In such attempt, a peace conference was invited in 
Rambouillet in France to find a peaceful solution to end the war in Kosovo. 
An agreement was presented that would end the ward and give Kosovo a 
comprehensive autonomy. Kosovo singed it and Serbia refused to sign the 
agreement. U.S. had made it clear that if Serbia refuses to sign, a NATO 
bombing campaign would follow. In absence of consensus in UN Security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The case of Croatia and Bosnia 
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Council, NATO had intervened and stopped the war from escalating and from 
spreading in the whole region. (Judah, 2008) 
 
The intervention was followed by a UN resolution in Kosovo 1244, which 
called for all Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo and proposed that the 
final status of Kosovo would be settled after that.  
 
Six years later, U.N had mandated ex president of Finland, Marti Ahtisari28, 
as a mediator of the negotiations on the future status of Kosovo in what were 
known as Vienna talks. After 120 days of negotiations Serbia refused to 
accept the agreement presented by Ahtisaari. In response, in a close 
coordination with U.S and majority of EU countries, Kosovo declares 
unilateral independence in February 2008.  
 
Serbia refuses to accept the unilateral declaration of independence and 
withdraws diplomatic missions in all countries who recognize Kosovo’s 
independence and it pledges to never recognize Kosovo’s independence.  
 
After independence, relations between Serbia and Kosovo were escalated 
further and as a response in the northern Kosovo29, in the city of Mitrovice30, 
local Serbs block all roads that connect them with the southern part of the city 
and express their ambitions to break away from Kosovo and join Serbia. 
When Vienna talks started, the Contact Group for Kosovo31 made clear that 
there should be: no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, no partition of 
Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or part of another country.32 These 
three principles were at the heart of the unilateral declaration of 
independence, and any move on further partition of Kosovo be deemed to be 
unacceptable by both EU and U.S.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 On 14 November 2005 Mr. Ahtisaari was appointed the Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (UNOSEK) for the future status process for Kosovo. 
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/speenvoy.html  
29 In This thesis the north of Kosovo includes: Northen city of Mitrovice, Zubin Potok, 
Leposavic and Zvecan 
30 Mitrovica is located in the northern part of Kosovo and it borders with Serbia. In 1999 with 
the NATO intervention the majority of Serbs moved from other part of Kosovo and remained 
in the northern part of the city. Due to the tentions, KFOR had put a fence on the Ibar bridge 
which divided the city officialy and it is still there for more than 15 years. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/664113.stm  
31 Contact Group is a group of six nations (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Russia 
with observers from EU and NATO) with the mission of overseeing Kosovo’s independence. 
The goal was to oversee Kosovo’s institutions in implementing the Ahtisaari plan. 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/ci/kv/c13102.htm  
32http://www.unosek.org/docref/fevrier/STATEMENT%20BY%20THE%20CONTACT%20
GROUP%20ON%20THE%20FUTURE%20OF%20KOSOVO%20-%20Eng.pdf  
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Serbia, as a response to unilateral independence backs local Serbs in Kosovo 
and pushes for an ethnic division between Serbs and Albanians. Through 
local Serbs, they recruit their intelligence service and run civil police. They 
create parallel structures in the Serb dominated municipalities were they pay 
for teachers, doctors and police officers to keep them connected with Serbia. 
Kosovo authorities were unable to do anything in the North since it was 
considered to be a political situation and local Serbs refused its authority. 
(ICG, 2012) 
 
From 2008 until 2010, EU makes important moves by giving Serbia two 
important carrots, Visa Liberalization and SAA, which were meant to 
increase the electoral support for than incumbent Prime Minister, Boris Tadic. 
Both these carrots were not conditioned specifically but they were meant to 
boost electoral support for pro-European parties in Serbia.33  
 
With Serbia placing parallel structures the north which already was a ‘frozen 
conflict’ became a no ones land and a place without laws, which created a 
safe heaven for criminal groups and it seriously challenged Kosovo’s 
sovereignty and EU’s ability to secure an enduring peace in the Balkans.  
 
Besides having placed parallel structures in Kosovo, Serbia had also blocked 
Kosovo in all international fora. Serbia refused to allow Kosovo to represent 
with its name, it blocked from having an international dialing code, it blocked 
Kosovo to play sports internationally, it blocked all citizens who held Kosovo 
documents to travel through Serbia, it blocked its aviation airspace for all 
airplanes who had Kosovo as their destination and it refused to accept any 
document with Kosovo’s stamps, which was blocking all economic activities.  
 
All these obstacles (and more) put by Serbia which were tolerated for three 
years after independence, had turned the north in a safe heaven for criminal 
groups which started to threaten the security of both parties, but what’s more 
importance this lawless situation in the north had blocked both sites, Kosovo 
and Serbia to move further in the enlargement process toward EU integration. 
The problem had no easy solution since it was centered around the 
recognition of authority of Kosovo, which local Serbs and Serbia refused to 
accept as it would amount to a recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The 
question of authority over that part of territory was the most important dispute 
between the parties and why they both refused to solve it as there would be 
resistance from both sides. 
Finding a solution for this problem was a tough job for any diplomacy since it 
entailed to have a neutral approach towards the situation otherwise it would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia/index_en.htm 
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risk to be considered as pro Kosovo or as pro Serbia. Nevertheless, the 
situation was solved under EU’s heavy mediation, how it was solves is very 
much the center of the thesis. 
 
 
 4. 1 EU presence  
EU is considered an important actor in the Balkans. In Kosovo from 1999 – 
2008, EU was present through member states participation in KFOR; 34 it had 
a special unit under UNMIK35 called “UNMIK European Union Pillar36 and 
from 2008 it is present through 37  the European Union Office in 
Kosovo/European, Union Special Representative (EUSR), through CSDP rule 
of law mission EULEX and through European Union Liaison Office in 
Kosovo.38 
 
In Serbia EU’s presence has been weaker compared to Kosovo due to the low 
salience from Serbian government under the Milosevic’s regime and under 
Radicals party of Vojislav Kostunica39. EU has had a delegation since 1982 
called “The Delegation of the European Commission in Belgrade,” which 
after Lisbon treaty changed its name to Delegation of the European Union to 
the Republic of Serbia. In EU words “this change also reflects the increased 
political role of our office in line with the political and economic 
developments in view of EU-Serbia relations during the last years”.40  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Twenty-four out of thirty-two KFOR members are EU countries, which means 24 out of 28 
EU members. 
35 United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
http://www.unmikonline.org/pages/default.aspx  
36 http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/kosovo/10/9.pdf  
37http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_en.htm  
38 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/index_en.htm  
39http://www.novinite.com/articles/159068/Serbia's+Democratic+Party+leader+Vojislav+Kost
unica+Quits+Politics  
40 http://www.europa.rs/en/o_nama/Istorijat_delegacije.html  
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    5.0 Empirical Findings  
 5.1 Explaining the puzzle, how do you make ex-enemies talk to each other? 
 
In this part I now look for evidence that would shed light on the negotiation 
process and see if the data collected respond to this thesis hypothesis. As 
stated in the methodology, I have combined the process tracing with 
interviews in a coordinated way, although some reflections and opinions from 
the interviews are also presented during the analysis part. The process tracing 
has taken place before the interviews so that the findings could be verified 
through the interviews. 
 
Process tracing is confined between 2010 and 2013, the rationale behind this 
is that the negotiation process has officially started on March 2011 
(Enlargment Strategy, 2011-2012) and until 19 April has resulted with eight 
agreements. For this thesis only three agreements are part of the analysis, 
namely agreement on ‘IBM Agreement” (2011)41, ‘Arrangements Regarding 
Regional Representation and Cooperation’ reached in (2012)42 and ‘First 
Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations’, known 
also as ‘Brussels Agreement’ (2013).43 For each agreement there is a one-year 
tracing which is considered enough knowing the bulk of information 
produced by all three actors, EU, Serbia and Kosovo.  
 5.2 Tracing IBM and Regional Representation Agreements  
  
With the situation worsening in the north, few or no one was expecting that 
Kosovo and Serbia would be starting a dialogue. Their leaders never agreed 
to even shake hands with each other before and many considered that EU 
does not have what it takes to do the undoable – reach agreement between 
Serbia and Kosovo. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 “IBM concept for the Western and Balkans is defined as follows: “IBM covers coordination 
and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security 
and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and integrated border management 
systems, in order to reach the common goal of open, but controlled and secure borders”. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/ibm_guidelines_e
n.pdf  
In case of Kosovo and Serbia there were two interpretations ‘One party recognizes the line as 
a border; the other party recognizes the line as administrative boundary’ 
42 Here and after refered as Agreement on IBM and Regional Cooperation  
43 Here and after known as Brussels Agreement  
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As the context prior to negotiations showed, EU has been present in both 
countries for more than a decade but its influence seem to have been low until 
Kosovo has declared independence.  
“EU has gained a new status after the declaration of independence by 
Kosovo. What has changed completely the picture, which has led us (EU) into 
the dialogue, is Kosovo declaring its independence in February 2008. I think 
that's the thing. Yes, and then from then, this in a way changed the picture, we 
had an international administration since 1999 with UNMIK and 2008 was a 
clear break, a clear new chapter. And following that the ICJ case, launched 
by Serbia, was the next move. And the rendering of the opinion of the ICJ 
meant that something new would need to follow. And that's when the EU 
actually comes to the forefront much more forcefully and suggests, there 
should be a dialogue and this dialogue then is blessed by the UN GA44 
Resolution from the 9th of September 2010.  
And this resolution is cosponsored by all EU-member states, plus Serbia. And 
this is really the start of the dialogue. There was a preparatory period for a 
few months with two sides and with international community and we started” 
(Gentilini and Boura, 2012) 
 
In a simplified version these are the events that led to the start of the 
negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. 
  
In a more complicated version, by the end of 2010, it became rather obvious 
that the further progress of Serbia towards EU had reached its peak and 
therefore Serbia could not get candidate status without addressing the 
neighbor/border issues and regional representation issues 45  (Enlargement 
Strategy, 2011-2012, p.27).  
 
In its struggle to oppose and block further recognitions of Kosovo’s 
independence, in June 2010 Serbia had requested an advisory opinion by 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether or not “the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo was in accordance with international law” 46. ICJ 
opinion was clear in stating that “By ten votes to four, is of the opinion that 
the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did 
not violate international law” 47 
 
Unsatisfied with the answer, Serbia took the initiative to ask UN for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 United Nations General Assembly  
45 Serbia refused to participate in regional initiative where Kosovo delegation was also present 
46 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf  
47 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/298 /page 54 
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resolution to reopen the status of Kosovo.48 EU warned Serbia that this is a 
dangerous move and would block Serbia’s road to EU. Instead EU proposed 
to make a joint resolution.49. In September 2010, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations had adopted the Serbia-EU initiated resolution which 
‘Welcomes the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a process of 
dialogue between the parties; the process of dialogue in itself would be a 
factor for peace, security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would 
be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European 
Union and improve the lives of the people.’50 51 
 
Reflecting on UN resolution and Serbia’s willingness to negotiate, EU sent a 
clear signal to both Serbia and Kosovo regarding neighborhood relations;  
 
‘(t)he Council reiterates the readiness of the EU to facilitate a process of 
dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. “(t)he Council reiterates that Serbia 
can accelerate its progress towards the EU, including candidate status, as 
soon as all the necessary conditions are met” (Council Conclusions on 
Enlargement, 2010, p.8).  
 
 With regard to Kosovo,  
 
“(t)he Council looks forward to a Commission proposal that will allow 
Kosovo's participation in Union programmes and calls on the Commission to 
continue assisting Kosovo in its efforts to meet the relevant requirements for 
a strengthened trade relationship” (Council Conclusions on Enlargement, 
2010). 
 
At this early stage, EU had already identified two big carrots for both. For 
Serbia the candidate status was conditioned with the start of the dialogue with 
Kosovo52, while for Kosovo, a ‘trade relationship’ was clearly states, which 
was translated as a possible SAA, such conditions were also confirmed in the 
interview with EU chief negotiator Robert Cooper (2012). 
“The dialogue is highly connected with the relationship for both Pristina and 
Belgrade, with the European Union. The question of Serbia’s candidate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20100910/160549247.html  
49 http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/09/us-serbia-kosovo-un-idUSTRE6885IJ20100909  
50 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/298  
51 This achievement was also a test for the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty that brought on the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ‘With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the EU has given itself the means to pull its weight on the global scene. The EU's role in the 
adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution on Kosovo is an example of this potential’ 
(European Commission 2010) 
52 Another condition was Serbia’s full cooperation with ICTY 
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status is linked…although it’s also true that, I believe Boris Tadic53 when he 
says that independently of the membership of the European Union, he wants 
to solve these issues. And it’s true, they need to be solved. But, nevertheless, 
the EU provides the context, and the relations with the EU are important for 
both Belgrade and Pristina. Candidate status is very important for Serbia. 
(Cooper, 2012) 
 
In the same year, Commission issues an enlargement strategy (2010), by 
pointing key challenges for the countries under the enlargement process. The 
language used with regard to Kosovo and Serbia was exceptional which was 
pointing to the need for cooperation if they desired to progress in the 
integration process ‘(b)ilateral issues should not hold up the accession 
process. The EU stands ready to facilitate the creation of the necessary 
political impetus in the search for solutions and to support related initiatives’ 
(Enlargement Strategy, 2010 -2011, p.10).  
 
In 2011, following the start of dialogue, EU starts to reformulate its language 
and to clear up the fog and fussiness about requirements. In the enlargement 
strategy (2011) it states that; 
‘The Commission urges them (Kosovo and Serbia) to make every effort 
towards solving outstanding border disputes in line with established 
principles and means, including referring issues to the International Court of 
Justice if appropriate’.  
 
Furthermore, the Commission sets clear steps for Serbia to follow if it wants 
to get the candidate status: 
 
‘The Commission therefore recommends that negotiations for accession to the 
European Union should be opened with Serbia as soon as it achieves further 
significant progress in meeting the following key priority: 
Further steps to normalise relations with Kosovo in line with the conditions 
of the Stabilisation and Association Process by: fully respecting the 
principles of inclusive regional cooperation; fully respecting the provisions of 
the Energy Community Treaty; finding solutions for telecommunications and 
mutual acceptance of diplomas; by continuing to implement in good faith all 
agreements reached; and by cooperating actively with EULEX in order for it 
to exercise its functions in all parts of Kosovo. 
The Commission will present a report on Serbia's implementation of the 
above key priority as soon as sufficient progress has been achieved’ 
(Enlargement Strategy, 2011-2012, p.27) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 At that time the Incumbent President of Serbia 
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With regard to Kosovo, Commission carefully indicates what is standing in 
the way of Kosovo to progress in the integration process. It is also careful to 
balance the responsibility for the chaos on the North. 
 
‘However, differences over the status of Kosovo have continued to obstruct 
the finalisation and signing of the Transport Community Treaty and the 
extension of the Autonomous Trade Measures for Kosovo and other Western 
Balkan partners. These differences remain an obstacle to the development of 
contractual relations between the EU and Kosovo. The Commission will 
continue supporting Kosovo's efforts in reaching the other two key objectives 
– eventual visa liberalisation and a trade agreement with the EU. The 
Commission proposes to launch a structured dialogue with Kosovo on the 
rule of law. (European Commission, 2011) 
 
At this stage, when negotiations were not yet leading to the two important 
agreements54, Commission uses Progress Report as a way of putting more 
pressure on the parties on the same issues that were being part of 
negotiations. Progress report with the start of negotiations had also turned 
into a mechanism that measured the implementation level o the agreements 
reached.  
EU sends progress reports and they don’t need to do more. They include 
everything in such reports. I have personally insisted that they also include 
the implementation of the achieved agreements in the progress reports as a 
measuring mechanism (Tahiri, 2014, p4). 
 
In the 2011 Progress Report, Commission criticizes Serbia for problems in 
the border with Kosovo. 
‘The lack of adequate control and surveillance of the administrative 
boundary line with Kosovo continues to be problematic in an area that is 
vulnerable to organized crime activities,” Progress Report on Serbia (2011). 
 
For the government of Kosovo, restoring the rule of law on the gates 1 and 31 
has been a top priority and has produced much material for domestic politics 
among position and opposition parties. In July, feeling impatience with 
Serbia’s delayed implementation of already achieved agreements, Kosovo 
made a unilateral attempt to restore order in that part by sending special 
police ROSU in order to impose a ban on Serb goods. EU did not welcome 
the move and it soon became subject of an agreement on costume stamps that 
solved the issue. 55 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Agreements on IBM and Regional Representation  
55 Both these gates were burned by local Serbs when Kosovo special police unit ROSU was 
sent at the gates to impose a ban on Serb goods. 
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“The north remains a particular challenge. EULEX has intensified its 
patrolling, registering and checking operations at gates 1 and 31 and along 
the border/boundary with Serbia. The data collected at the two gates are 
shared with the Kosovo Customs Service and Serbian customs. However, full 
customs controls at gates 1 and 31 were not restored, due to political 
circumstances. 
At the end of July, the situation escalated in northern Kosovo when Kosovo 
decided to impose an embargo on Serbian goods in retaliation to a Serb 
blocking of goods since 2008 on the grounds of the non-recognition of the 
"Customs of Kosovo" stamp. The decision on an embargo followed a failure 
to reach an agreement on Kosovo customs stamps within the framework of 
the EU facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which was 
launched following last year's UN General Assembly resolution. The 
unilateral deployment of Kosovo police at gates 1 and 31 in northern Kosovo 
led to violence, resulting in the death of a Kosovo police officer. Calm was 
restored with the help of KFOR, the NATO-led military presence. In 
September, the issue of customs stamps was resolved in the context of the 
Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. The implementation of the agreement resulted in 
widespread blockades in the north, including at the gates 1 and 31. Violent 
incidents also occurred. The tensions in northern Kosovo need to be defused, 
and free movement of people and goods re-established. All actors need to 
play their part in this process. In the light of the situation in northern Kosovo, 
Serbia interrupted its participation in the dialogue at the end of September”. 
Progress Report on Kosovo (2011) 
 
In the end of September 2011, Serbia leaves the negotiating table in Brussels 
as a sign of protest for the situation on the North. In absence of free passage 
due to the blocks on the roads, EU had decided to accompany Kosovo 
Costume officers by helicopters, a move which Serbia didn’t like. 
Nevertheless, in November Serbia returns to the negotiating table. On the 
question of what made it possible for Serbia to return to negotiating table:  
 
Again,	  it's	  in	  the	  EU	  process	  and	  the	  EU	  calendar.	  December	  is	  a	  very	  
important	  time	  of	  the	  year	  for	  everyone	  involved	  in	  the	  EU	  but	  for	  Serbia	  
and	  Kosovo	  as	  well.	  Decisions	  were	  expected	  by	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  
Council,	  by	  the	  Heads	  of	  States	  and	  by	  the	  ministers	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  a	  lot	  was	  
at	  stake	  for	  Serbia	  and	  for	  Kosovo. (Boura, 2012) 
 
But	  basically	  I	  think	  what	  has	  happened	  is	  that,	  and	  we	  knew	  that	  already,	  
that	  both	  sides	  know	  that	  there	  is	  no	  alternative	  to	  this.	  Their	  issues,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-s-government-ready-to-deploy-it-s-force-in-
the-north  
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problems	  have	  to	  be	  solved	  through	  dialogue.	  I	  think,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  
determination	  both	  in	  Belgrade	  and	  Pristina	  to	  solve	  issues	  mutually	  and	  
through	  dialogue.	  Of	  course	  this	  creates	  sometimes	  frictions,	  problems,	  
which	  needs	  to	  be	  overcome,	  but	  ultimately	  both	  sides	  see	  that	  they	  can	  
benefit	  a	  lot	  from	  dialogue.	  I	  think	  it's	  normal	  that	  they	  pursue	  dialogue	  (Gentilini,	  2012)	  
 
By the end of November 2011, there had already been five agreements 
reached56with two agreements still to be reached on IBM and Regional 
Representation. In October 2011, Commission issues the Opinion on Serbia’s 
application for membership, which heavily criticizes Serbia; 
“Serbia maintains its structures in Kosovo and organised parallel municipal 
by-elections in May 2008, which is inconsistent with UNSCR 1244/1999. 
Serbia failed to play a constructive role in the return of Kosovo Serb and 
Kosovo Albanian judges and prosecutors to the Mitrovica District Court, 
which remains staffed only by EULEX personnel. Declarations by some 
Serbian government officials, in early 2011, discouraging the participation of 
Kosovo Serbs in the census in north Kosovo had a detrimental effect, which 
contributed to the census not taking place in northern Kosovo. Serbian 
mobile operators maintained the activities of unlicensed branches in Kosovo. 
Similar activities in the provision of electricity were also maintained. There 
were a number of statements by high officials advocating partition of 
Kosovo” Commission Opinion on Serbia (2011). 
 
Nevertheless, fearing that Serbia might block further negotiations and leave 
again, EU Commission recommends giving Serbia the candidate status, 
despite lack of progress and with still two important agreements yet to be 
reached.  
 
First the Commission;  
 
1. The Commission recommends that the Council should grant Serbia the 
status of candidate country, taking into account progress achieved so far and 
on the understanding that Serbia reengages in the dialogue with Kosovo and 
is moving swiftly to the implementation in good faith of agreements reached 
to date. 
2. Serbia is well on its way towards sufficiently fulfilling the political criteria 
set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the conditions of the 
Stabilisation and Association process, provided that progress continues and 
that practical solutions are found to the problems with Kosovo. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 1) Freedom of Movement, 2) Civil Registry Books 3) Acceptance of University Diplomas 
4) Customs Stamps 5) Cadastral Records 
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Commission therefore recommends that negotiations for accession to the 
European Union should be opened with Serbia as soon as it achieves further 
significant progress in meeting the following key priority: 
3.Further steps to normalise relations with Kosovo in line with the conditions 
of the Stabilisation and Association Process by: fully respecting the 
principles of inclusive regional cooperation; fully respecting the provisions of 
the Energy Community Treaty; finding solutions for telecommunications and 
mutual acceptance of diplomas; by continuing to implement in good faith all 
agreements reached; and by cooperating actively with EULEX in order for it 
to exercise its functions in all parts of Kosovo. (Commission Opinion on 
Serbia’s Candidate Status, 2011, p.12) 
 
Than the Council; 
 
In light of the progress achieved so far by Serbia and taking note that Serbia 
has already reengaged in the dialogue and is moving swiftly to the 
implementation in good faith of agreements reached, the Council takes note 
of the positive assessment of the Commission and the recommendation to 
grant candidate status which will be considered by the European Council, in 
line with established practice. The Council expects Serbia to address the 
question of regional cooperation. (The Council, 2011, p.22) 
 
‘The Council notes that the opening of accession negotiations will be 
considered by the European Council, in line with established practice, once 
the Commission has assessed that Serbia has achieved the necessary degree 
of compliance with the membership criteria, in particular the key priority of 
taking steps towards a visible and sustainable improvement of relations with 
Kosovo. Council Conclusions (2011), 11 
 
Both Commission and the Council had recommended candidate status for 
Serbia aware that IBM and Regional Representation agreements were not yet 
reached. Usually Commission’s recommendation is hardly ignored by the 
European Council when it comes to enlargement, but this time European 
Council disregards both Commission and Council and decides to condition 
directly the candidate status with further progress on normalizations of 
relations with Kosovo57. European Council was clearly not satisfied only with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 In particular, Germany had refused to give Serbia candidate status; Merkel is quoted to have 
said “At the moment Serbia does not meet the conditions of the EU accession process, Good 
neighborly relations and regional cooperation are a part of the European Union enlargement 
policy according to the Copenhagen criteria, and I am very sorry that Serbia has not met those 
expectations so far and therefore has not fulfilled the preconditions for obtaining of the 
candidate status” http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/germany-dashes-serbia-s-eu-
candidacy-hopes  
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IBM agreement being reached in 02 December 2011, thus it wanted also an 
agreement on regional representation. 
 
The European Council notes the considerable progress Serbia has made 
towards fulfilling the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European 
Council and the Stabilisation and Association Process requirements and that 
a fully satisfactory level has been reached in its cooperation with ICTY. It 
welcomes the fact that Serbia has re-engaged in the Belgrade- Pristina 
dialogue and is moving forward with the implementation of agreements in 
good faith and it welcomes too the Agreement on IBM. With a view to 
granting Serbia the status of candidate country, the European Council tasks 
the Council with examining and confirming whether Serbia has continued to 
show credible commitment and has achieved further progress in moving 
forward with the implementation in good faith of agreements reached in the 
dialogue, including on IBM, has reached an agreement on inclusive regional 
cooperation and has actively cooperated to enable EULEX and KFOR to 
execute their mandates. In the light of its examination, the Council will take a 
decision in February 2012 on granting Serbia candidate status, to be 
confirmed by the March European Council. (European Council Conclusions, 
9 December 2011) 
 
 The interviews also confirm such direct conditionality:  
 
“We are now coming to the end of dialogue, I hope that we will finish with an 
agreement on Regional Cooperation, if this goes well, Serbia will get the 
Candidate Status. Kosovo will thus follow the same European course as all 
the others.”58(Cooper, 2012) 
 
Again, it's in the EU process and the EU calendar. December is a very 
important time of the year for everyone involved in the EU but for Serbia and 
Kosovo as well. Decisions were expected by the Council, the European 
Council, by the Heads of States and by the ministers of the EU and a lot was 
at stake for Serbia and for Kosovo. This was the first time that the Member 
States would take stock of what the member states have achieved and signal 
their satisfaction and their new step could take place. Which in the case of 
Serbia could have been granting them a candidate status. That did not 
happen, it could happen very soon. In the case of Kosovo it meant that they 
would get a text of conclusions that would indicate that Kosovo has made 
progress, that Kosovo has done well and that Kosovo should move on with 
new elements in its relationship with the EU. (Boura, 2012) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 “The Agreement” movie by Karen Stokkendal Poulsen, minute 24:00-25:30 
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…all I can say is…European Union…the European Council, it didn’t give 
candidate status to Serbia in December, it did underline respect for the 
progress Serbia had made, and then it underlined a couple of issues, which 
needed to be resolved. And one of them at least need to be resolved in the 
dialogue; they are connected to the dialogue, they can be done, I hope they 
will be” (Cooper, 2012) 
 
That the regional representation agreement was the only condition standing 
on the way of Serbia’s candidate was proven a week after the agreement was 
signed, in 24 January 2012. A week after the agreement is signed; European 
Council confirms the candidate status for Serbia. 
 
That EU wanted both agreements to be signed before candidate status was 
given was a part of strategy: 
Sometimes	  you	  have	  to	  put	   issues	  aside	  for	  a	  while,	  because,	  although	  the	  
issues	  are	  handled	  separately,	  nevertheless,	   if	   issue	  x	   is	  being	  seen	  as	  very	  
important	   in	   Pristina	   and	   issue	   Y	   is	   something,	   which	   is	   very	   difficult,	  
maybe	  if	  you	  package	  those	  two	  things	  together,	  you	  can	  sell	  them	  better	  in	  
Pristina.	  Maybe	  the	  same	  is	  true	  in	  Belgrade	  as	  well”	  (Cooper,	  2012).	  
 
For Kosovo, conditions weren’t all clear and the promises were more indirect. 
As the word ‘eventual’ illustrates, EU was not planning to give Kosovo any 
big carrot59 right away.  
 
‘The Council reaffirms that Kosovo will also benefit from the perspective of 
eventual visa liberalization once all conditions are met. The Council recalls 
that the Dialogue, and agreements reached through the Dialogue, will 
continue to be of crucial importance for both parties as they take further steps 
towards fulfilling their EU perspective, and calls upon both parties to 
intensify their work in the coming period. Council Conclusions (2011), 12 
 
Being aware that both visa and SAA were not within reach for Kosovo during 
negotiations due to technical conditions, EU finds other carrots that were 
attractive for Kosovo, such as participation in European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), where Kosovo would benefit from 
the loans so much needed for economic recovery.  
 
Without prejudice to Member States' positions on status, the Council invites 
the Commission to assess Kosovo's progress with regard to trade related 
issues and to propose the way forward for an agreement as soon as sufficient 
progress has been made. The Council recognises that Kosovo's socio-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Such as the promise for Visa Liberalization or Signing of SAA 
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economic development would also be enhanced through membership of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, without prejudice to 
Member States' positions on status. (Council Conclusions 2011) 
 
By signaling the clear candidate status for Serbia and a real possibility for 
opening the accession negotiations, conditioned with progress on dialogue, 
and by giving Kosovo the green light for EBRD membership, an eventual 
visa and trade possibility EU had already influenced the two upcoming 
agreements on IBM and Regional representation which were signed in 
December 2011, and February 2012. 
  5.3 Tracing the Brussels Agreement 
 
 
Yet, EU had no intention to stop the dialogue without achieving substantial 
progress on the overall normalization of relations between Serbia and 
Kosovo. With negotiations entering a higher stage the EU also upgraded its 
representation with HR Catherine Ashton mediating future negotiations. The 
political dialogue was clearly a new phase and a harder one; 
When this (technical dialogue) started it was absolutely same stance in 
Kosovo and Serbia. This is only technical issues, no status, no that, no 
political issues, just something that ordinary people would benefit from the 
talks, like civil registry, cadastral and freedom of movement, and than in one 
point things were raised to political level, partly as a EU initiative, which at 
the beginning of the dialogue it was hard to imagine that both parties, 
Belgrade or Prishtina will welcome something like this, to start this real 
political talks. (Pavicevic, 2014) 
 
Apparently it all started in New York. Ashton used the presence of, Serbia’s 
President Tomislav Nikolić and Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Hashim Thaçi in 
an official visit in New York (September, 2012) to open the issue of political 
dialogue on the high level. Kosovo at the beginning of technical dialogue had 
ruled out political dialogue as a possibility as this was very unpopular in 
public and it meant to open the issue of status all over again. 
 
Nevertheless, it became evident that without real progress on normalizations 
of relations between the two parties, progress towards EU was impossible.   
 
Knowing the sympathy and loyalty of Kosovar public for United States, 
Ashton makes a diplomatic move by inviting Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton in a joint visit in the Balkans with a clear mission of ‘persuading 
Kosovo and Serbia’s governments and opposition leaders into starting the 
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dialogue’. The moves was successful which resulted positive and with full 
support from all political spectrum, except the radical groups in Serbia, and 
the nationalistic movement in Kosovo “Vetvendosje”60 In a press conference 
for media in Kosovo, Clinton states; 
“For	  me,	  my	   family	   and	  my	   fellow	  Americans	   this	   is	  more	   than	   a	   foreign	  
policy	   issue,	   it	   is	  personal61.	   I	  am	  here	  today	  with	  EU	  High	  Representative	  
Catherine	  Ashton	  because	  the	  U.S.	   fully	  supports	  aspirations	  of	   the	  people	  
of	  Kosovo	  to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  integration.	  Kosovo’s	  
future	  is	  in	  Europe.	  We	  will	  be	  with	  you	  on	  that	  road,	  we	  will	  be	  with	  you	  
while	  you	  discuss	  normalization	  of	  relations	  with	  Serbia”	  (Clinton,	  2012)62	  
 
After meeting with Ashton and Clinton, in a press conference, Ivica Dacic 
(PM of Serbia) states: 
Clinton	  and	  Ashton	  "did	  not	  set	  new	  ultimatums	  and	  conditions",	  but	  that	  
they	  rather	  traveled	  to	  Belgrade	  "to	  discuss	  the	  issues	  of	  life	  importance	  to	  
Serbia	   -­‐	   continuation	   and	   acceleration	   of	   European	   integrations	   and	  
fulfilment	  of	  criteria	  for	  getting	  a	  date	  for	  the	  start	  of	  negotiation.	  Serbia	  
will	  not	  recognize	  Kosovo	  and	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  forced	  to	  do	  that	  by	  the	  
EU	  or	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  	  Serbia	  "will	  do	  everything	  possible	  to	  normalize	  
relations	  with	  Priština	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  joint	  integration	  into	  the	  European	  
Union.	  
 
Having for two days world most powerful foreign policy representatives, like 
Clinton and Ashton, holding long meetings with leaders from both countries 
turned out to have had a huge impact and influence on changing the attitude 
and position towards negotiations, and although they don’t admit it explicitly 
the question of accession negotiations was part of the talks.   
The consent of both capitals to upgrade negotiations in the high level required 
that Prime Ministers now be heading the delegations. Having such consent, 
EU starts to articulate new issues that need to be solved in order for Serbia to 
open the accession negotiations and for Kosovo to open negotiations for SAA 
and decision for visa liberalization.  
In the enlargement strategy in 2012 and in the statement by the spokesperson 
of HR, EU puts forward new conditions and requirement for both countries; 
“A visible and sustainable improvement in relations between Serbia and 
Kosovo is needed so that both can continue on their respective paths towards 
the EU, while avoiding that either can block the other in these efforts. 
The Commission underlines that the steps leading to the normalisation of 
relations between Belgrade and Pristina should also be addressed in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60http://koha.net/arkiva/index.php?page=1,13,140667&s=dialog&ch=13,31,14,15,16,17,52,9,
10&f_d=31.10.2010&t_d=31.05.2013  
61 Referring to Bill Clinton’s personal efforts for ending the War in Kosovo  
62http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=10&dd=31&nav_id=82923 
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context of the framework for the conduct of future accession negotiations with 
Serbia” (Enlargement Strategy, 2012-2013) 
 
On the basis of the good progress in the last year, Serbia obtained the status 
of candidate country in February. The High Representative encouraged the 
authorities to continue to move forward with the reforms and the efforts 
towards EU integration. In particular, she encouraged Serbia to take steps 
towards a visible and sustainable improvement of relations with Kosovo, 
crucial for opening of accession negotiations and Serbia's EU perspective in 
general.  
The High Representative and President Nikolić also discussed the 
continuation and intensification of the dialogue between Belgrade and 
Pristina. Catherine Ashton stressed the need for Serbia to boldly engage in 
these talks and encouraged President Nikolić to be ready to take some tough 
decisions. (Statement by HR spokesperson, September 2012, A 429/12) 
 
While for Kosovo; 
 
The Council calls on Kosovo to continue implementing in good faith all 
agreements reached to date in the Dialogue and to engage constructively on 
the full range of issues. The steps leading to the normalisation of relations 
between Pristina and Belgrade will also be addressed in the context of the 
next steps on Kosovo's European path, in the interest of having a 
comprehensive approach. 
With a view to a possible decision to open negotiations for a SAA with 
Kosovo, the Council will examine on the basis of a report to be presented by 
the Commission and the HR/VP in Spring 2013 progress on all the above 
issues. The Council will assess the report during the next Presidency. 
Provided the assessment is positive the Council will adopt the negotiating 
directives. 
 
All these conditions were articulated in October 2012. From October until 
April ten rounds of negotiations were held between Kosovo and Serbia under 
Aston’s mediation.  
What EU had offered to the parties in order to influence the Brussels 
Agreement, came into light only later after the agreement was reached. 
 
In its enlargement conclusions in 2013, the council recalls; 
Both the accession of Croatia to the EU as the 28th Member State on 1 July 
2013, as well as the historic agreement reached by Serbia and Kosovo in 
April 2013, are a strong and visible testimony of the transformative and 
stabilising effect of the enlargement and stabilisation and association 
process. (Enlargement Conclusions, 2013) 
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While in the Annual report from HR to European Parliament a list of 
‘rewards’ given to both Serbia and Kosovo are listed; -­‐ In 2012, the EU launched several initiatives with Kosovo.  -­‐ In January, the visa dialogue was opened and led to the establishment of a 
visa roadmap in June.  -­‐ In May, a structured dialogue with the Commission on the rule of law was 
launched.  -­‐ In October the Commission issued its feasibility study for a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement. With a view to a possible decision to open 
negotiations for a SAA with Kosovo the Council decided in December to 
examine during the first semester of 2013 the progress made by Kosovo, on 
the basis of a report to be presented by the Commission and the HR. (annual 
report of HR to Parliement 2013) -­‐ In April 22, three days after the agreement was signed, EU signs “First 
contractual agreement between EU and Kosovo on benefits of the programs” 
and the Council authorises the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo 
(Recommendation for a Council Decision, COM (2013)) 
 
At the same date, April 22, Serbia gets also positive recommendations from 
Commission for the opening of negotiations for accession.  
On this basis, the Commission considers that Serbia has met the key priority 
of taking steps towards a visible and sustainable improvement of relations 
with Kosovo. 
The Commission therefore recommends that negotiations for accession to the 
European Union should be opened with Serbia. (Joint report to the European 
Parliament and the Council, 2013) 
 
Process tracing has clearly revealed how EU has step by step used its 
enlargement to conditions negotiations and to influence the process. 
Interviews were able to reveal more information on the EU’s strategies or 
instruments that were not visible in the process tracing; 
I think that the European Union is vital in solving the problems. Actually, we 
are, the ambition to join the European Union is also a key factor. It means 
that they are sometimes ready to accept solutions from the European Union, 
because they see themselves as prospective members. For us in the dialogue 
it’s very useful this, because, that they want to become members, because one 
of our rules, and it’s almost the most fundamental rule in the dialogue, one of 
our rules is that where there’s a solution in European law, this is the solution, 
which we will apply in the dialogue. And it’s extremely convenient because it 
gives us an objective standard that nobody can argue with. (Cooper, 2012) 
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“And	  how	  do	  you	  make	  the	  world	  better,	  the	  answer	  is,	  bit	  by	  bit.	  By	  solving	  
small	  problems	  here	  and	  there.	  When	  we’ve	  solved	  this	  problem,	  in	  due	  
course,	  both	  Serbia	  and	  Kosovo	  will	  become	  members	  of	  the	  European	  
Union	  and	  that	  means,	  that	  not	  only	  is	  there	  one	  problem	  less,	  it	  means	  that	  
we’re	  stronger;	  that	  you’ve	  not	  only	  removed	  the	  negative,	  but	  you	  add	  to	  
the	  positive.	  It’s	  the	  spread	  of	  civilization.”	  (Cooper,	  2012)	  
6.0 Assessing Influence  
 
 
The nature of the thesis was stated in the methodology part as both an 
exploratory and explanatory research. I have put forward two straight 
hypotheses relating to the research question, first that “EU has heavily relied 
on enlargement conditionality to exert influence on the parties, and second, 
that Europeanization process has had a profound impact in changing the 
orientation and transforming the two countries. 
 
I have also identified variables of interest and the intervening variables that 
have a potential in influencing the outcome  
 
An explanation-building model and an analytical explanation model of 
process tracing were proposed to analyze empirical findings. The process 
tracing was able to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain 
and causal mechanisms between the independent variable and the outcome of 
the dependent variable.  
 
Now it is time to connect the dots and analyze the causal relationship between 
the use of EU foreign policy instruments and the outcome of negotiations.  
  6.1 Locating EU foreign policy instruments 
 
6.1.1Enlargement conditionality 
 
Part of the thesis goal is to explore the EU foreign policy instruments that 
were utilized during the negotiation process to exert influence. A clear divide 
between diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments was provided 
by (Smith, 2003) and (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008), nevertheless it was 
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argued that under enlargement conditionality the instruments tend to collide 
and give EU a much more strong foreign policy instrument.  
As the empirical findings suggested, EU influence in Kosovo and Serbia was 
increased with the declaration of independence from Kosovo. In one hand, 
after the declaration of independence, EU presence increases in Kosovo, 
which gives EU a more proactive role. In other hand, Serbia, which was 
under attack of radical parties after the declaration of independence, passes 
the European test by electing pro-EU parties in Parliament in 2008 elections 
and committing this way itself to pursue a European path in exchange for 
SAA and visa liberalization.  
 
Enlargement conditionality was depicted as the EU’s strongest foreign policy 
tool, which provides mechanisms and incentives that can be calculated in 
material interests (Grabbe, 2006) (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008).  
 
Enlargement was proven to be key for EU to achieve the success in 
negotiations. Kosovo and Serbia were attaching great salience to the process 
and were in desperate need to progress in the EU, which in return gave EU 
the possibility to exert influence in the negotiations.  
 
As it was argued, Enlargement conditionality served as an umbrella for EU 
under which, high-level visits, official statements, progress reports, candidate 
status, accession negotiations, visa liberalization and trade relations were 
interlinked in a political dialogue that aimed at normalizing relations between 
Serbia and Kosovo.  
 
Empirical findings suggest that United States was particularly influential in 
convincing Kosovo delegation to engage in the dialogue and to put more trust 
on EU. 
 
The findings suggest that EU had to exert much more influence in Serbia 
rather than Kosovo, since Kosovo was acting more constructively. Serbia left 
dialogue once and only the promise for the candidate status brought her back 
to the table.  
 
The same instruments that worked in the two agreements were to a large 
extent used also in the Brussels Agreement. The compromise for the Brussels 
Agreement was considered much higher therefore the promise had also to be 
clear. Accession negotiations were put on hold for Serbia as long as they 
didn’t agree to resolve the situation on the north, while Kosovo was given 
guarantee that with the signing of Brussels Agreement, EU would ensure that 
five nonrecognizers would not block the visa and SAA ratification process. 
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Table 2.0 
EU Foreign policy instruments utilized in case of 
Kosovo-Serbia Negotiations 
 
ENLARGMENT CONDITIONALITY 
Economic 
Instruments 
Diplomatic 
Instruments 
  
SAA Agreement 
(trade agreement) 
Visa Liberalization  
Candidate Status 
Accession 
Negotiations 
High level visits 
Official Statements 
Progress Reports 
 
6.1.2 Official visits and Statements 
 
The process tracing63 and interviews have revealed that official visits have 
had a huge impact in exerting influence. High Representative, Catherine 
Ashton has had 7 official visits since the start of the dialogue where she met 
with representative leaders in order to gain support for negotiations. The fact 
that both parties were committed to dialogue is considered to be a merit of the 
official visits as much as conditionality. Besides high-level visits, during 
negotiations time, there have been more than 20 official statements regarding 
the dialogue, which among others, as empirical findings showed have called 
on parties to make tough decisions. High-level visits and statements are part 
of the diplomatic instruments as portrayed by Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 
(2008) and Smith, (2003).  
 
6.1.3 Others 
 
Interviews have been able to show other instruments that were considered 
very functional during the actual negotiations. The first refers to the influence 
of EU legislation, or acquis communautaire as a nonnegotiable principle for 
any country that wants to become a member. Cooper (2012) has stated that 
“one of our rules is that where there’s a solution in European law; this is the 
solution, which we will apply in the dialogue. And it’s extremely convenient 
because it gives us an objective standard that nobody can argue with”.  
 
This is neither a diplomatic nor an economic instrument but more of a legal 
argument, which consists of doing nothing from EU part and everything from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Appendix I 
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the aspiring member state. In this case, both Kosovo and Serbia had to agree 
to change its legislation and find deals not at their choice but according to EU 
legislation as long as they both aspire to become members.  
 
The second instrument brought from the interviews is the influence of official 
reports. This refers specifically to the progress reports which EU issues every 
year for countries under enlargement.  
As one interviewer said: “EU sends yearly progress reports and they don’t 
need to do more. They include everything in such reports”. During the 
dialogue, EU used progress reports to send clear signals what each party 
needed to do in order to get the necessary reward, and as the empirical 
findings show most of the conditions brought up on progress reports were 
linked with issues that needed to be solved during dialogue.  
 
And third was EU making his own proposal, which showed that it was not a 
facilitator but a mediator “Sometimes, they find the solutions themselves, 
sometimes you can stimulate them by putting forward solutions. Normally 
what you do when you’ve come to a block in the road, try and see what ideas 
the two sides have, take a timeout, talk to them one by one, consult them on 
yourself, one in our team may have an idea, but give them a little bit of time 
to think about is as well, time is good. So that’s why we normally on the 
different issues do quite a lot of preparation, we talk to the two sides 
separately. On some issues, and I’m thinking here on the issue of regional 
cooperation, which is coming up now, I think we won’t actually put a 
proposal on the table until we’re about 98% sure that both sides are going to 
accept it.”(Cooper, 2012) 
 
Reflecting on the concept of influence put forward by Schunz (2010), it is 
safe to say that EU has been in control of the outcome of negotiations. First it 
ensured that both parties had attached great salience to the integration process 
and made sure that there is a public support in each countries and second, it 
put forward clear rewards in exchange with particular outcomes. The fact that 
candidate status was refused for Serbia even though all technical conditions 
were met and contrary to Commission and Council recommendations showed 
that EU was aware that parties would not leave the negotiations process as 
long as there is a clear reward waiting ahead.  
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6.2 The power of Europeanization  
One of the key identified intervening variables, considered to have had a deep 
impact especially on the mind changing of the two sides is considered to be 
the Europeanization process.  
 
This thesis has acknowledged the concept and ideas of Europeanization as a 
social constructivist approach and has adopted it as an approach in explaining 
the readiness of the two countries for making agreements.  
 
The fact that Serbia had agreed to sit and talk with Kosovo was already a big 
step showing maturity and a sense of responsibility. Serbia had a long 
tradition of relations with Russia and was considered the only country in the 
western Balkans with such close ties with relations. The interviews revealed 
that there are still mixed feeling about this new orientation of Serbia towards 
EU and also for Kosovo.  
 
Marko Jacksic who is Major of a small Serb municipality in Kosovo, which 
was subject of the Agreement on normalization of relations, on the question 
of; Why do the Serbs like Russia more than the Western countries? There are 
many reasons why, but two of them are key. It is a geopolitical question. The 
interests of Russia and America clash here. The Albanians are allies of the 
Americans and by relation the West. Russia is the ally of Serbia and by 
relation also of the Serbs that live here. Simply put: what has happened in the 
UN Security Council thus far64, says a lot about why the Serbs like Russia as 
opposed to the EU. (Jacksic, 2012) 
 
The fact that Kosovo has acted constructively towards international 
community has to do a lot with the role of the United States65, which was 
decisive both for NATO intervention and for declaration of independence. In 
EU there are still five countries that do not recognize Kosovo, which justifies 
to some extent the resistance of Kosovo to put trust in EU. The chief 
negotiator for Kosovo, who is also a deputy prime minister in Kosovo, Edita 
Tahiri states that; “U.S	  has	   always	   been	  a	   partner	   for	  Kosovo.	   EU	  has	  not	  
been	  able	  to	  deliver	  neither	  in	  Bosnia	  neither	  in	  Kosovo”	  (Tahiri,	  2014)	  
 
By offering Kosovo an European agenda, despite five nonrecognizers, and by 
giving Serbia, both SAA and visa liberalization, in return for pro-european 
government, EU had contributed to a significant change in leadership of 
Serbia and Kosovo.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Russia has used the veto to block NATO intervention and Ahttisari plan on behalf of Serbia 
65 The impact of which is held constant with regard to the outcome of negotiations.  
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In this Europeanization framework, it meant that during accession process 
intensive negotiations occur between working groups in Brussels and Serbia, 
thus a socialization process has been fairly evident which proved to have had 
a profound impact in the administration and in the political and legal system, 
especially in Serbia. Dacic’s declaration that “will	  do	  everything	  possible	  to	  normalize	  relations	  with	  Priština	   for	   the	  sake	  of	  a	   joint	   integration	   into	  the	  European	  Union,	  is	  a	  testimony	  to	  such	  change	  in	  orientation.	  Serbia	  didn’t	   do	   anything	   before	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   no	   one. Than there is visa 
liberalization process, which has given the possibility for Serbs to move 
freely in EU and gave them a sense of belonging to the European Community 
who have been isolated for a long time66.  
 
These changes in the structures are acknowledged by Structural Foreign 
Policy approach by Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008). Börzel and Risse 
(2011) also acknowledge the impact of structural foreign policy, but they 
frame it under capacity-building or technical assistance67. “Research has 
identified the differential empowerment of domestic actors who are then 
enabled to promote institutional change by providing political elites with 
incentives (electoral support, shaming campaigns) as an effective mechanism 
of Europeanization” a mechanism which they consider to be very effective in 
changing the structures. (Börzel & Risse, 2011, p.9). SAA and Visa 
liberalization for Serbia were for electoral support only. 
 
Therefore Europeanization as a set of rules posed by EU on the candidate 
countries in order to change the countries political system and elite has had a 
profound impact in “mind changing” which has enabled the parties to start the 
dialogue and to stay committed in search for agreements in appropriate with 
their integration ambitions.   
 6. 3 Assessing Logic of behavior   
The above analysis has shown accession criteria as the most important 
independent variable where EU was in control of the outcomes of 
negotiations process, and it showed that Europeanization was an important 
intervening variable which has worked as a “mind changer” both consisting in 
institutional change and leadership change through socialization effect. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Kosovo has recently concluded negotiations for SAA and is under the promise of eventual 
visa liberalization 
67 Technical assistance in this thesis is referred to Instrument for Pre-accession, under which 
Kosovo and Serbia receive tens of millions of euros each year.  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/agriculture/enlargement/e50020_en.htm  
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This part of analysis has the intention to analyze what logic of action has 
dominated EU’s behavior in dialogue and tries to make a connection between 
the conditionality- logic of consequences where actors are conceived as 
(mostly self-interested) utility maximisers who select their course of action 
according to cost–benefit calculations. And Europeanizaiton process or the 
logic of appropriateness - where actors are thought of as rule followers who 
‘do the right thing’ because they want to be part of a particular community 
and have been socialised into following rules. (Börzel & Risse, 2000, p.7) 
 
For March and Olsen (2009), a theoretical challenge is to fit different 
motivations and logics of action into a single framework. Specific logics, 
such as following rules of appropriateness and calculating individual expected 
utility, can be good approximations under specific conditions. It is difficult to 
deny the importance of each of them (and others) and inadequate to rely 
exclusively on one of them. (March & Olsen, 2009, p.19) 
Europeanization is considered to support both logics of actions in this thesis, 
since it provides for influence of direct mechanisms such as “conditionality” 
and indirect mechanism such as socialization and mind changing, or rule 
fowlloing.  
The findings in this thesis suggest that both logics have been present during 
the dialogue. The start of the dialogue, which was initiated by Catherin 
Ashton (EU), was based on the belief that both parties were showing great 
salience to the integration process. Progressing in the accession process is a 
huge electoral impetus for the incumbent governments, thus it expected that 
both Serbia and Kosovo should follow a EU agenda.  
The expectations for countries to act in accordance with their ambitions were 
apparent,“I think that the European Union is vital in solving the problems. 
Actually, we are, the ambition to join the European Union is also a key 
factor. It means that they are sometimes ready to accept solutions from the 
European Union, because they see themselves as prospective members” 
(Cooper, 2012).  
By making clear to the parties that agreements would be reached in 
compliance with EU legislation was a way of saying that this is the right way 
to do things. 
Although the logic of appropriateness was evident, it does not capture the 
essence of success, which to a large extent relied in threats of conditionality. 
Compromise during the dialogue, especially in case of Serbia, was a pure 
cost-benefit calculation. Conditioning all three agreements with candidate 
status and accession negotiations was a pure threat from EU. Such logic 
where consequences follow a certain kind of action or inaction were evident, 
which meant that if no agreement were reached there would be no reward. 
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7.0 Conclusion  
 
“European	  Union	  is	  the	  future.	  We’re	  the	  city-­‐states	  of	  Renaissance	  Italy,	  
the	  wonderful	  peak	  of	  civilization.	  But	  at	  the	  time	  that	  Machiavelli	  wrote,	  
Europe	  was	  becoming	  Europe	  of	  Nation	  States.	  Now	  we’re	  moving	  into	  a	  
world	  of	  continents	  and	  if	  you	  want	  it	  to	  have	  to	  count	  it’s	  going	  to	  have	  to	  
work	  together.	  And…So..I	  believe	  in	  Europe	  as	  our	  future	  and	  I	  like	  it”	  Cooper,	  2012	  
 
This thesis has examined EU influence in case of Serbia and Kosovo dialogue 
with a focus on foreign policy instruments.  
Understanding the puzzle of EU success in brining Kosovo and Serbia into 
the table of dialogue, which resulted in three landmark agreements, has been 
the main subject of the thesis. The findings showed that the key to such 
success has been EU membership perspective that was successfully 
conditioned with particular rewards during the dialogue.   
 
There has been a huge influence from United States and Russia in Balkans, 
but the effective use of foreign policy instruments, such as enlargement 
conditionality and the strategic use of rewards have slowly but effectively 
reoriented the two countries policies and has linked their interest with 
European Union.  
 
For EU increasing influence in its own region has been a top priority and the 
success achieved through Kosovo and Serbia negotiations is a testimony that 
Lisbon changes in the field of CFSP, especially regarding EEAS were an 
important achievement and have contributed into closing the long hindering 
issue of expectation capability gap, at least in its own region.  
 
The findings suggest that when EU follows a unified policy externally, it is 
much more influential. Of course the context matters. The fact that both 
countries are prospect members with a clear membership promise enables EU 
to be more rigor, nevertheless in the past EU has suffered from a disunited 
approach and little or no influence in the Balkans. 
 
Of course, for Brussels to show the real muscles, it needs to keep the 
membership door open as the key to exerting influence. At least in Balkans, 
this thesis has proved that EU has become the most important man in town. 
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